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DD/I WAR PLANS

(Notes from Speech to CIA Reserve Officer's Unit on 12 September 1955
by Robert Amory, Jr., Deputy Director (Intelligence))

ASSUMPTIONS AS TO THE KIND OF WAR TO WHICH THE PLAN WOULD BE ADDRESSED:

1. Not to a Korea type or even an Indo-China intervention - no real change would be seen under these conditions.

2. If an all-out war takes place - likelihood of extreme brevity. Sir John Slessor has put it: "No chance to use things or people not on hand or in place."

Survivors at anytime would be preoccupied with improving measures to plug holes caused by destruction.

Therefore, the possibility of a long war (year or more) would be fairly remote.

DISCUSSION

The following is the DD/I Plan in the most general terms. It is now in the hands of offices and office plans are due in by 15 October for approval:

DD/I Activities - (Production of Intelligence; Services of Common Concern)

30% Collection

30% Collation - Reference

30% Specialized Research - Scientific - Basic Economics - Geographic

10% Production of General Intelligence: Current - National Estimates - National Intelligence Surveys.

Wartime would see considerable proportional readjustment but no complete omission.

Looking at the assigned mission, office by office, would be as follows:

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Collection - 0/0

FBID - little change seen - emphasis on speed of dissemination.

1. Process enemy communiques, including info and propaganda.
2. Furnish direct support to Theatre Cmdrs (would not be under their control because optimum place of reception likely to be outside theatre)
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3. Utilization of mobile units (These are now available in [REDACTED] one recently used in [REDACTED])
4. Conducting propaganda analysis in support of Psychological Warfare activity, etc.

Contact Division:

Generally similar to current mission but in addition, would operate the AS Pers Interrogation Center - Administration for this JCS agency is a joint task force representing State, AEC, and DD/P. Its personnel includes nearly $\frac{1}{2}$ from DD/P, 40% DD/I and State.

Foreign Document Division:

Generally the same as current mission but with a pool of linguists for especially "hot" documents.

ASDIC for captured documents - this work may well involve theatre teams but all would be under the Military, not DD/P leadership.

Sovmat Division:

JTIS would handle military analysis, but civilian economic and production data would be a Sovmat responsibility as it is now.

Possibly would be staffed with liaison officers or integrated officers in CEE Depots in Theatres.

OCR

Mission would be the same as current one but more expeditious - night shifts would be necessary in registry, cable branch, etc. An effort would be made to integrate related data into

- 2 -

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the industrial register not so much for strategic bombing as to have some validity for occupation and rehabilitation planning.

NSC 69 World-wide Frequency File - another example of an activity that would have to run faster to stay in place.

ORR - [REDACTED]

DD/I activity likely to have the largest proportional expansion.

15-man teams to each theatre -- [REDACTED] specialist would be with the technical intelligence coordinator in each Corps' area with the bulk of personnel in combat zone. If theatre desires an analytical center - CIA is prepared to staff it in whole or in part.

Otherwise, the concentration would be on a centralized exploitation and analysis of photos in Washington, ATIC or Aberdeen.

General Economic Intelligence

Mission will be the same as now for the Bloc but will automatically become responsible for overrun areas as it did for Northern Viet Nam last year. The EIC will be maintained and strengthened to avoid conflicts. Stress will be on rapidly changing factors and critical vulnerabilities in civil economy. In support of, but acknowledging primacy of Military Services, work will continue on military and scientific production.

Economic warfare support will be another major area of expansion.

Geographic- Photo Intelligence

Mission both at home and abroad remains largely to be worked out. Special geographic support, primarily to clandestine services and Air Force E & E, will be a major task. Map library and cartographic services will continue to be required.

OSI

A quick review of World War II is all that is needed to see how important continuation of its basic work will be.

Considering the parochial bias of the services in this area, it will, in the last analysis, be the country's chief reliance for anticipating enemy development of really new weapons - techniques, etc.

Final thrashings of a nihilistic enemy may introduce very bizarre things.

Closest collaboration will be maintained with OSRD - NSF.

OBI

Its whole purpose is to have basic intelligence ready when and where needed.

NIS planned on 15 year basis: The number one task would be to fill and publish on a crash basis the obvious gaps in the basic NIS's. Secondly, to put out main supplements and revisions as needed. (Exploit files for all other purposes.) Then, a big task after victory in support of occupation and military government needs.

OCI

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There is a big question as to the role of OCI and CIA in the top Washington [REDACTED]

The President must have an all-source complete Situation Room and must be briefed with one voice.

Frankly, there probably will be a hassle as to whether the JCS excludes OCI or not. Assuming that right prevails, OCI will man:

1. A National Current Intelligence Center growing out of the indications work.

2. Intelligence side of the President's Situation Room. Otherwise, mission will be to keep top level people informed as now on relevant world situation.

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Insofar as is consistent with the foregoing, OCI will provide [REDACTED] individuals to handle substance and briefings to senior CIA officers overseas.

- 4 -

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ONE

Again, it depends on whether the NSC and IAC machine withers. But again, sound solutions to these problems (i.e. restricting JIC to purely military estimates) would find National Estimate machinery in high gear. Best of all would be to have the JIC as the military subcommittee of the IAC.

Particular stress would be placed on neutrals and "wobblies" and on results of such courses of action as "Unconditional Surrender," dropping A-bomb on Hiroshima, etc.

No particular direct support or participation by ONE at the theatre level is contemplated.

SUMMARY

1. DD/I functions can't be axed to provide officers for theatre activities for DD/P or otherwise.

2. Most DD/I functions can be handled by persons not qualified by physique, age, sex, etc. for active military assignments.

3. Therefore a plan is needed for substitution of individuals based on these criteria:

- a. When in doubt a person should remain in place.
- b. Where he clearly has a scarce qualification (e.g. para-trooper, mountaineer, etc.) — he should go to paramilitary work.
- c. Equally true that where one is specially qualified in a non-intelligence field he should go to it. (e.g. amphibious - Military government, etc.)

Therefore, DD/P has a claim, but not an overriding one, on DD/I officers.

d. Biggest element of DD/I program must be some reserve registers:

- (1) Graduate Reserve (Ex-employees)
- (2) Civilian Reserve (Qualified civilians who have not worked full time for CIA.)

This means clearances constantly valid; commitment from individual and agency, and specific slotting.

- 5 -

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4. Assume fullest possible integration [REDACTED]
(We are already exploring the problem with them.)

5. No DD/I apparatus to or within theatre commands. Substantive Officers could be either integrated in J-2 sections or lower echelons, or else integrated into DD/P 4th force organization as intelligence-support O's.

- 6 -

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